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Abstract
In 2010, 42 million people worldwide were displaced from 
their homes as the result of environmental factors . These 
“environmental migrants” lack international recognition 
and have no recourse to the protections of the international 
refugee regime . Given Canada’s history of international 
refugee resettlement, this paper examines Canada’s 
past and potential response to environmental migrants . 
Evidence reveals that the Canadian government relies on 
ad hoc, temporary measures, and that clear, long-term 
policy measures for issues surrounding forced migration 
due to environmental events are unlikely . The implications 
of this outcome are discussed, providing observations and 
lessons for researchers and advocates of migration rights .
Résumé
En 2010, 42 millions de personnes à travers le monde on 
été déplacées pour des causes environnementales . Ces 
« migrants environnementaux » ne sont pas reconnus sur 
le plan international et n’ont donc pas de recours possi-
ble en vertu du régime international des réfugiés . Compte 
tenu de l’histoire canadienne en matière de réinstallation 
de réfugiés au niveau international, cet article examine 
les réactions canadiennes passées et futures à la migration 
environnementale . Les données montrent que le gouverne-
ment canadien se fie sur des mesures temporaires, ad hoc, 
et qu’il est peu probable qu’il mette en place des mesures 
et des politiques à long terme répondant aux problèmes 
liés à la migration environnementale forcée . On y dis-
cute des implications de ces résultats, tout en offrant des 
observations et des conclusions pouvant intéresser les cher-
cheurs et les avocats en droit de la migration .
Tens of thousands of mostly poor people have died . Tens of 
millions have been temporarily or permanently displaced 
… We must, above all, shift from a culture of reaction to a 
culture of prevention . 
—Kofi Annan1
Introduction
Each year, humanitarian crises worldwide displace millions 
of people from places that once provided them with shelter, 
livelihood, and a sense of community. With little time to 
plan and few available resources, affected individuals and 
families, even entire villages, must move in response to the 
deterioration of their natural environment and at times 
cross international boundaries into neighbouring countries 
to seek safety. Described as a global phenomenon, “environ-
mental migration” has the potential to affect a significant 
number of individuals.2 While the effects are far-reaching, 
certain regions are especially vulnerable to environmentally 
induced population displacement. Factors such as a high 
population density, combined with a drought- or flood-
prone climate, or proximity to a geographic risk factor such 
as an active fault line increase the risk of environmental dis-
placement. Areas especially at risk for large-scale environ-
mental migration are the Himalayan region, which may face 
severe water shortages due to glacial retreat, Pacific island 
states, and the drylands of Central America where consider-
able vulnerability to both drought and severe weather in the 
form of hurricanes exists. The Nile, Ganges, and Mekong 
River delta regions are also particularly at risk for major 
flooding, e.g., the flooding of large sections of Bangladesh 
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that displaced thousands during the 2010 monsoon season. 
In addition, the Sahel and Great Lakes regions of Africa are 
particularly at risk and have experienced acute and gradual 
environmental declines leading to migrations as a result of 
droughts and intensive land degradation.3 In 2010, an esti-
mated 42 million people were displaced from their homes 
as the result of immediate and long-term changes in the 
physical environment4—a figure that is roughly equal to 
the number of people displaced by war and persecution dur-
ing the same period.5 By the year 2050, the total estimated 
number of people likely to be displaced by changes in the 
biophysical environment is expected to reach 200 million, 
with some research indicating that the total number could 
be as high as 700 million.6
Multiple terms have been used to describe groups of 
individuals that are forced to move or choose to move 
in response to changes in their physical environment. 
Examples of terms used include environmental migrant, 
environmental refugees, and environmentally displaced 
people . Convention refugees, as defined by the 1951 United 
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, are 
displaced persons who are offered a measure of protection 
by the international refugee regime. If, however, the cause 
of their displacement is due to an advancing drought, nat-
ural disaster, land loss, degradation, or other environment-
ally related factors, migrants may find that no guarantees of 
protection exist and they may be faced with the possibility 
of returning to a country they had once fled to confront a 
very uncertain future. In the long term, the indirect effects 
of climatic change are expected to increasingly influence 
human migration.7
In this paper we use the term environmental migrant 
to describe individuals or communities of people that 
must move or choose to move from a location as the result 
of changes in their biophysical environment. Migration 
resulting from immediate changes to the biophysical 
environment due to an acute event such as a natural disas-
ter, or from long-term changes that cannot be directly recti-
fied or mitigated by policy interventions are circumstances 
that would be classified as “environmental migration” in 
this context. This understanding of environmental migrant 
does not eliminate other intervening variables as causal 
explanations for migration. However, this paper suggests 
that migration caused by a clear shift in an individual’s or 
communities’ biophysical environment (for example, access 
to land for housing is removed, the quality of soil is irrevoc-
ably harmed or ability to produce food is eliminated, or 
access to necessary resources for survival like clean water 
are permanently disrupted) warrants the classification of 
environmental migration . This understanding conforms to 
the definition of environmental migrant advocated by the 
International Organization for Migration and elaborated 
below.
Given this context, this paper examines how and if 
national governments, particularly ones that are high immi-
grant- and refugee-receiving countries, are responding to 
environmental migrant populations. Owing to Canada’s his-
torical role in international debates and policy development 
concerning migrants and refugees, and its legacy and repu-
tation as a high immigrant- and refugee-receiving country, 
this paper asks two questions: How has Canada responded 
to forced migration and environmental migration events? 
And what does this experience teach us about the prospects 
for future responses to environmental migration?
Historically and in the very recent past, Canada has 
responded to incidences of forced migration with policy 
directives that have facilitated migration to Canada, pro-
vided status to migrants already in the country, expedited 
immigration processing, and provided other benefits to 
displaced persons if they have fallen within certain defined 
categories. Temporary and ad hoc, these policy directives 
allow policy-makers and the national government to make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis and to be flexible in the 
face of incidences of forced migration. This approach also 
has its drawbacks, however, and at times the result has been 
piecemeal policy development that amounts to a “wait and 
see” approach to the issue of forced migration. The few 
policy measures that are currently in place in Canada are 
not comprehensive and leave important decisions regarding 
the processing of individuals affected by disasters up to the 
discretion of individual immigration officers.8 For example, 
Canada contributed to the relief effort in Haiti following 
the 2010 earthquake. The government issued policy direc-
tives after the earthquake as a temporary way of facilitat-
ing Haitian migration to Canada. These directives, a result 
of a natural disaster, were developed directly and solely in 
response to the event in Haiti and were not part of a broader 
policy or strategy relating to environmental migration gen-
erally. Does Canada’s response to the earthquake in Haiti 
illustrate its present and future policy to environmental 
migration? Or will this event, other potential natural dis-
asters, or expected migration due to environmental change 
lead Canada to develop a clearer policy and position on its 
response to and treatment of environmental migrants?
Using the events in Haiti, this paper argues that tempor-
ary, ad hoc policy directives will likely remain the princi-
pal response to environmental migration by Canada in the 
future. The immigration policy directives issued following 
the Haitian earthquake demonstrate the current state of 
environmental migration policy in Canada, which, argu-
ably, is based on ad hoc, temporary measures, as opposed to 
a stable long-term approach. While it can be argued that this 
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approach allows for flexibility and a considered response to 
global migration needs on a case-by-case basis, it does not 
provide any clear national or global indication of how and 
if Canada will respond to future events of environmental 
migration. The absence of a position or policy provides no 
assurance to environmental migrant or refugee advocates 
about how the government will respond to future inci-
dences of displacement, provides little guidance to individ-
ual immigration and refugee officers, leaving them to make 
decisions about admittance to Canada based on temporary, 
ad hoc policies, and priorities, and will do little or nothing 
to assist the international community in its future response 
and protection of environmental migrants.
This paper continues by first discussing environmental 
migration and its general relationship to refugee policy, 
including Canadian refugee policy. The paper then exam-
ines the response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, which 
illustrates why Canada has addressed and likely will con-
tinue to address environmentally caused migration on a 
case-by-case basis.
Environmental Migration: The Conceptual 
Challenge
Considerable effort has been devoted to developing a def-
inition of environmental migration that can gain inter-
national recognition and encompass the range of environ-
mentally induced circumstances that lead to forced 
migration. Prominent international organizations such 
as the International Organization for Migration and the 
United Nations University (UNU) have voiced their sup-
port for granting international recognition to environ-
mental migrants. UNU-Environment and Human Security 
Director Janos Bogardi has stated, “There are well-founded 
fears that the number of people fleeing untenable environ-
mental conditions may grow exponentially as the world 
experiences the effects of climate change and other phe-
nomena … this new category of ‘refugee’ needs to find a 
place in international agreements. We need to better antici-
pate support requirements, similar to those of people fleeing 
other unviable situations.”9 Borgardi’s statement falls short 
of calling for the sort of recognition granted to conven-
tion refugees; however, it does underscore the international 
community’s inability to find a place for environmental 
migrants within the existing protection framework for dis-
placed persons. On its own, the international recognition 
of environmental migrants does not directly address the 
consequences of environmental migration; however, it is 
viewed as a useful policy objective for its ability to support 
other policy initiatives. Often international aid is directed to 
issues that have the backing of a constituency that can exert 
political pressure.10 Accordingly, international recognition 
of environmental migrants could be an important step 
towards developing an environmental migrant constitu-
ency that could direct resources and institutional support 
towards their particular needs.
United Nations Environment Programme researcher 
Essam El-Hinnawi is often credited with first attributing 
the term environmental refugee to individuals who have 
been displaced as a result of environmental causes. In 1985, 
El-Hinnawi described environmental refugees as “those 
people who have been forced to leave their traditional 
habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked 
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by 
people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously 
affected the quality of their life. By ‘environmental disrup-
tion’ in this definition is meant any physical, chemical, and/
or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) 
that renders it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to 
support human life.”11 The term environmental refugee has 
since become popularized, perhaps as a result of the term’s 
ability to draw parallels between the more familiar circum-
stances of political refugees fleeing persecution and the 
plight of individuals displaced by some form of degrada-
tion to their natural environment. The term environmental 
refugees evokes images of people fleeing devastation due to a 
natural disaster or other environmental catastrophe, and it 
is perhaps for that reason that the term has gained currency 
in the media and the wider public consciousness. From a 
policy perspective, there is also a potential benefit to the 
notion of an environmental refugee. Associating migration 
induced by environmental or biophysical conditions with 
conventional refugees might allow environmental refugees 
to benefit from the same kinds of protections offered by the 
international refugee-protection regime already in place. 
However, in practice this has not occurred. Despite initial 
attempts to better define the concept of an environmental 
refugee, use of the term is contentious, and there remains 
no general agreement on how to classify people displaced as 
the result of changes in their environment. There are several 
reasons for this ambiguity.
First, the term refugee carries a legal designation estab-
lished by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees . A refugee under the provisions of the convention 
is defined as “a person who owing to a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the pro-
tection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.”12 The refugee convention makes 
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no mention of the environment as a possible factor inciting 
forced migration from an area of residence, thereby exclud-
ing environmental migrants.
Second, the refugee convention is concerned with 
addressing circumstances of forced or involuntary migra-
tion—circumstances in which people could not reasonably 
choose to stay within their country of origin. The degree 
of volition involved in an individual instance of migration 
due to environmental circumstances generally exists on a 
continuum that is often very subjective: at one end of the 
continuum, the migration is involuntary, e.g., displacement 
due to floods or earthquakes, while on the other end of the 
continuum, the decision to migrate could be voluntary, e.g., 
inhabitants determine that the biophysical conditions are 
too poor and difficult to permit a livelihood to be sustainable 
and therefore migrate. There have been several attempts to 
develop a classification that defines what constitutes volun-
tary environmental migration versus the involuntary var-
iety; the work of Diane C. Bates is one example.13 However, 
it has proven difficult to make clear distinctions between 
the two. Even in the event that it were possible to classify 
environmentally induced migration more clearly, any effort 
to classify people migrating in response to environmental 
conditions as “refugees” is still impeded by the wording of 
the refugee convention, which requires that a person claim-
ing to be a refugee experiences a form of persecution.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the majority of 
those displaced due to environmental causes do not cross 
an international border; rather, they are displaced internally 
and remain within the confines of their own country and 
therefore would not be the focus of any policies or programs 
designed to assist convention refugees.14
The issues noted above represent a significant challenge to 
a stronger international protocol or national policy relating 
to environmental migration. The challenge is particularly 
high if there is a desire to include environmentally displaced 
people under the current international refugee protection 
regime. Still more disheartening for environmental migrant 
advocates is the possibility that the “environmental refugee” 
concept is having a paradoxical effect, as refugee-receiving 
countries are seeking to limit their obligations under the 
refugee convention in order to avoid responsibility for an 
anticipated “flood” of environmental refugees.15 It seems 
that conflating environmental refugees with political refu-
gees is blurring the already well-established line of who 
has the legal right to seek asylum, thus potentially threat-
ening the asylum process of convention refugees instead of 
enlarging the refugee regime to include the environment-
ally displaced. In an effort to maintain the rights available 
to refugees under the current refugee protection regime 
and to develop a concept that is more encompassing of the 
multifaceted character of environmental migration, a num-
ber of alternative terms have been suggested, each with its 
own strengths and weaknesses.
Among the terms that appear in the environmental 
migration literature are ecomigrant, which demonstrates 
the link between the economic and ecological factors that 
influence migration.16 Another concept is environmentally 
displaced person (EDP), which is useful for its similarity 
to internally displaced person (IDP), a displaced-persons 
category that has gained a degree of recognition through 
international “soft law” such as the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement .17 Within contemporary writ-
ing, environmental migrant is a term that has also gained 
a high level of support. The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) has adopted the term and has put forward 
the following definition: “Environmental migrants are 
persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons 
of sudden or progressive change in the environment that 
adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged 
to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either tem-
porarily or permanently, and who move either within their 
country or abroad.”18 The IOM definition establishes that 
the environment can be a critical factor that influences an 
individual or group to migrate. The language used in the 
definition addresses acute, short-term displacement as well 
as chronic, long-term displacement and takes into account 
the internally displaced in addition to those displaced 
across international borders. Further, the environmental 
migrant concept, as it is defined by the IOM, accounts for 
the multivariate nature of environmental migration and 
allows for a range of environmental migration circum-
stances. It has been noted that the IOM definition is limited 
by its omission of language that distinguishes between vol-
untary and forced migration; it also does not identify which 
state or non-state institution is responsible for the persons 
displaced.19 However, it would be difficult for any definition 
to completely account for the myriad circumstances that 
constitute environmental migration.
In this paper, we accept that the term environmental 
migrant has the strongest and best utility globally. It encom-
passes immediate and prolonged changes in biophysical 
conditions that cannot be rectified or mitigated with policy 
or program interventions. As explained in the introduc-
tion, this does not eliminate the role that other factors could 
play in motivating migration, but it does emphasize that 
within instances of environmental migration the primary 
factor is an immediate or long-term pronounced change in 
the biophysical environment that renders the capability to 
maintain a sustainable livelihood impossible or extremely 
difficult.
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Researchers involved in the study of environmental 
migration argue that some form of international recogni-
tion of environmental migrants is an essential policy object-
ive that must be met in order to gain wider support from 
the international community.20 Nevertheless, international 
recognition is only one aspect of a larger effort to address 
environmental migration. Ultimately, if a concept is to gain 
global acceptance in the international system, acceptance 
and support in nation-states are first required. Hence, the 
paper continues by considering examples of state-level policy 
initiatives that have been put in place to manage environ-
mental migration in the absence of formal international rec-
ognition. For the purposes of this paper, various terms may 
be used interchangeably to refer to environmental migrants; 
however, the definition provided by the IOM should serve 
as the point of reference for all subsequent discussion.
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policy and 
Environmental Migration
The causes of environmental migration are varied and 
interconnected. Consequently, occurrences of environ-
mental migration present policy-makers with a set of chal-
lenges that span a wide array of policy areas. Policy-makers 
given the task of addressing incidents where populations 
have been displaced by natural events have several issues to 
consider. First, the decision of an individual to migrate in 
times of environmental change or disaster is usually based 
on a complex set of factors that often have as much to do 
with a potential destination offering greater opportunity for 
a livelihood as with the risk associated with staying in an 
environmentally degraded area. This is because the polit-
ical, social, and economic environment in which migrants 
find themselves is often just as influential as the state of the 
natural environment.21 Second, policy relating to environ-
mental migration does not just respond to an immediate 
event, but also has to address the likelihood of future events 
that could lead to forced migration. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that environmental migration gives rise to 
a broad set of policies found in areas as diverse as natural 
resource management, international development, environ-
mental protection, economic development, and national 
security.22 However, it is not the aim of this paper to review 
the range of policies relating to the issue of environmental 
migration; rather, the discussion will centre on Canadian 
immigration and refugee policy as it relates to forced migra-
tion and environmental migration.
In the following sections, this paper first provides a gen-
eral overview of migration and refugee policy in Canada. 
This paper then considers the case of the 2010 Haitian earth-
quake—a clear example of an environmental migration 
event. Together, these historic and recent events provide 
evidence to support the argument that temporary measures 
towards environmental migrants are likely to remain the 
standard practice.
Canadian Refugee Policy: Historical Precedents
Canadian immigration policy has prioritized international 
migration that best contributes to the country’s economic 
growth. Be it settling the sparsely populated Canadian West 
for the purpose of agriculture during the nineteenth cen-
tury, or the recent focus on attracting highly skilled immi-
grants and temporary foreign workers, Canada’s tendency 
to relax admission requirements and allow large influxes 
of migrants usually occurs in conjunction with some form 
of economic imperative. Despite the overarching economic 
motivations associated with Canadian migration policy, 
immigration based on humanitarian factors has also played 
a significant role in the evolution of Canada’s immigration 
system.
Canada’s polices concerning refugee admissions were gen-
erally developed and implemented ad hoc until the country 
formally committed to the refugee convention in 1969. This 
step began the transition towards a formal process of grant-
ing protection to asylum seekers. However, there still exist 
large categories of displaced persons, e.g., environmental 
migrants or internally displaced persons, who are not cov-
ered under the formal refugee process. Furthermore, the 
Canadian government has taken steps to restrict the inflow 
of refugees under certain categories, with the stated reason 
being an effort to reduce the number of fraudulent asylum 
claims. For example, a provision of the recently enacted 
bill C-31, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 
establishes designated countries of origin (DCO). A DCO is 
deemed a country that does not normally produce refugees. 
Refugee claimants originating from DCOs are prohibited 
from applying for work permits and are denied health-care 
services under the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). 
In addition, while standard refugee claimants have 60 days 
to prepare their claims, DCO claimants must be prepared 
to present their claim within 30 days of their initial request 
for asylum.23 The expedited refugee process is intended to 
dissuade fraudulent claims, yet critics of Bill C-31 claim 
that the latest reforms to the Canadian refugee system deny 
rights to vulnerable refugee claimants.24 Given this context, 
how does the Canadian government respond at times when 
migrants are not persecuted but are displaced as the result 
of environmental events?
Special Measures: The Canadian Response to the 2010 
Haitian Earthquake
The January 2010 earthquake, which struck near the 
Haitian capital city of Port-au-Prince, caused widespread 
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destruction and thousands of deaths. It was a natural event 
made considerably worse by the economic and political 
instabilities of Haiti’s recent past. High poverty, poor con-
struction standards, an underdeveloped infrastructure, 
and a general lack of public services turned an earthquake 
of major proportions into a tragedy of catastrophic scale. 
To illustrate this point, the 1989 San Francisco earthquake 
that registered a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale was 
equal in strength to the Haitian earthquake, yet the San 
Francisco earthquake caused 63 casualties, a fraction of 
the tens of thousands of lives lost in Haiti.25 While differ-
ences in natural risk factors explain some of the dispar-
ity between the casualty statistics of the Haitian and San 
Francisco earthquakes, the role that Haiti’s political insti-
tutions, social conditions, and limited economic resources 
played in exacerbating the environmental catastrophe of 
2010 are significant.
Despite the contributing factors, the displacement caused 
by the earthquake conforms to the definition of environ-
mental migration. Norman Myers, an environmental migra-
tion researcher, notes that several decades of environmental 
and political mismanagement in Haiti have led to a situa-
tion where the majority of the Haitian population seeking 
asylum in other countries are doing so for environmentally 
related reasons, as opposed to the many who sought asylum 
from the persecution of authoritarian government during 
previous times in Haiti’s turbulent history.26
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the Canadian gov-
ernment mounted a humanitarian response to the crisis. In 
addition to the financial and material resources provided 
by the Canadian government to assist with relief and recon-
struction, Canadian migration policies played an import-
ant role in addressing the problems caused by disorgan-
ized environmental migration in Haiti. The Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) implemented 
several policies that facilitated the efforts of Haitian nation-
als who were seeking to enter or remain in Canada. The 
implementation of those policies was accomplished largely 
using operational bulletins, which CIC uses “in exceptional 
circumstances” to issue “one-time-only instructions or to 
provide urgent instructions to staff for a brief period.”27
Prior to the earthquake in Haiti, Operational Bulletin 
(OB) 83, “Guidelines for Priority Processing in the Event 
of Disaster Situations,” was issued in 2008. The operational 
bulletin advises visa offices to use the discretionary pow-
ers granted to them by the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act to prioritize and expedite applications for 
permanent or temporary residence in Canada from coun-
tries affected by a natural disaster. OB 83 is a general oper-
ational directive. In effect, it is a reminder to visa offices that 
they possess the latitude necessary to respond to disasters 
in a “humane and expeditious manner.”28 CIC clearly states 
that OB 83 is not a special program, nor priority process-
ing, and it is the applicants’ responsibility to demonstrate 
to the visa officer that they or their family members have 
been adversely affected by the disaster. In practice, OB 83 
has not facilitated the migration of a significant number of 
displaced persons, since the responsibility of demonstrating 
the hardship caused by the disaster is placed on the affected 
individual, which may prove to be a significant barrier to 
entry into Canada, depending on the extent to which that 
person’s life has been disrupted by the disaster. Moreover, 
beyond imprecise recommendations to exercise their dele-
gated discretion, the bulletin provides minimal guidance 
to immigration officers making decisions on applications 
for permanent residency from individuals displaced by an 
environmental disaster. The outcome is a potential for a 
lack of consistency, as immigration offices and officers can 
interpret the merits of a natural disaster and its impact on 
applicants differently.
Following the Haitian earthquake, an additional oper-
ational bulletin was implemented to address the humani-
tarian crisis: OB 179, “Special Measures in Response to the 
Earthquake in Haiti.” OB 179 instructed CIC officers to 
deliver immigration services to Haitian nationals that they 
might otherwise be ineligible to receive. In order to exped-
ite the immigration process for Haitians seeking perma-
nent residence in Canada, the special measures authorized 
the creation of the Ottawa Haiti Processing Office, which 
focused solely on processing immigration applications 
from Haiti. In addition, priority processing, fee exemptions, 
interim federal health coverage, as well as work and study 
permits were granted to selected Haitians seeking perma-
nent residence. Further, a portion of the special measures 
addressed the ongoing adoption applications of Haitian 
orphans. The special program known as Operation Stork 
expedited the adoptions of Haitian orphans and evacuated 
several hundred Haitian children in the immediate after-
math of the earthquake.29
Policies intended to address the needs of Haitians already 
living in Canada were also a part of the Canadian govern-
ment’s response strategy. One such policy, the Temporary 
Suspension of Removals (TSR), suspended the deportations 
of Haitians who would otherwise be ineligible to remain in 
Canada. Unlike refugee status, which is granted on an indi-
vidual basis according to the particular circumstance of the 
refugee claimant, TSR is a blanket protection available, with 
exception, to all nationals, from the designated country.
Predominantly clustered in the French-speaking city of 
Montreal, a significant Haitian diaspora community resides 
in Canada. The Canadian governor general at the time of the 
earthquake, Michaëlle Jean, herself a former refugee from 
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Haiti, was very involved in bringing attention to the situa-
tion in Haiti after the earthquake. These factors may explain 
the Canadian government’s willingness to use immigration 
and refugee policy to implement a significant humanitar-
ian response to the disaster in Haiti, providing protection 
to thousands of displaced Haitians. Nevertheless, the tem-
porary and ad hoc nature of the immigration programs put 
in place should cause some concern amongst advocates for 
displaced persons and environmental migrants.
Gaps in protection and vulnerabilities may develop as a 
result of the implementation of temporary, ad hoc directives. 
For example, representatives from organizations that work 
directly with refugees in Canada identified TSRs as an area 
of concern to a Standing Committee on Citizenship and 
Immigration in 2006. The committee participants noted 
that, while protected from immediate removal, displaced 
persons residing in Canada as a result of the TSR program 
are unable to become permanent residents, sponsor family 
members, and go on with their lives; they often work in low-
paying jobs and are limited in their access to health servi-
ces and education.30 As a result, the benefits of temporary 
residency protection in the case of Haitians or any other 
future group affected by a natural disaster is low. Lacking 
the legal protections of convention refugees, environmental 
migrants with temporary forms of status may find that they 
receive protection from one context of vulnerability (the 
environmental disaster) only to find themselves confined to 
another (temporary residency with no clear timeframe and 
few services of support).
Special measures provide governments with the ability to 
offer protection to individuals who migrate internationally 
as the result of environmental events. The ad hoc nature and 
temporary duration of these policy instruments are appeal-
ing to governments, since special measures are adaptable 
policies that allow a government to prioritize humanitarian 
crises while keeping in mind other economic, security, and 
political considerations without being bound to a certain 
course of action by international law. However, those same 
characteristics have the potential to undermine the already 
precarious security of environmental migrants, as govern-
ments may use their discretion to select which disasters they 
respond to, on the basis of their affiliation with the affected 
country and its residents. Selecting migrants and accepting 
refugees in relation to “national affinity” is common. But 
in the midst of disasters where global support is needed, 
particularly from countries where immigration has been 
and is essential to a country like Canada, inconsistent, ad 
hoc, and temporary policy measures present serious con-
cerns for a unified, global response to catastrophic events. 
For example, there was significant public debate regarding 
the discrepancy between Canada’s robust humanitarian 
response following the Haitian disaster, and the relatively 
subdued response to large-scale flooding in Pakistan just a 
few months later.31
The Canadian government’s response to humanitarian 
crises varies, yet one principle is consistent: at the time of 
unanticipated international events that cause mass dis-
placement, the Canadian government has responded in an 
ad hoc manner. It has chosen to evaluate the events and 
develop a response in retrospect and often only after pres-
sure has mounted on it to do so. For anyone hoping that 
the Canadian federal government might develop a clear 
and consistent policy position on the issue of displacement 
caused by environmental change, this legacy does not bode 
well. It also suggests that Canada is unlikely to take a lead 
in advancing a global position or protocol on environ-
mental migration. Even though international bodies like 
the UNHCR or the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) can, and do, identify data and models suggesting 
the potential for increased human displacement from 
environmental change in the future, the problem remains 
that the Canadian government has a legacy of “waiting and 
seeing.”
For better or worse, the “wait and see” policy approach 
has served national governments well, as each can align 
its migration and refugee policies and practices to its own 
preferences. In short, history suggests that even when the 
Canadian government has responded admirably to forced 
migration and refugee events in the eyes of international 
observers, it has still done so on a case-by-case basis.32 
For forced migration events that are the result of political 
upheaval or conflict, this type of policy response may be 
understood. However, natural disasters occur regularly, and 
extreme weather events pose an increased threat, particu-
larly for nation-states that are low-lying and prone to flood-
ing or sea-level rise.33 The 2011 Foresight Report on migra-
tion and global environmental change notes that while no 
particular policy or set of policies can entirely mitigate the 
effects of migration due environmental change, polices that 
prepare for and respond to the effects of environmental 
migration can facilitate planned and coordinated move-
ments while reinforcing the long-term resilience of com-
munities and households.34 Hence, a clear, consistent policy 
position on environmental migration would seem to have 
merit. More clarity and consistency would offer migration 
and refugee advocates clarity on the likely actions of the 
government in future events and help them develop con-
tingencies necessary to respond and assist; it would better 
ensure consistent actions between Canadian immigration 
offices and officers when responding to environmental 
migration events and emergencies globally; and it would put 
Canada in the lead in international discussions and debates 
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surrounding environmental migration—debates that are 
surely going to become more important in response to the 
ongoing and increasing effects of climatic change.
Conclusion: The Future of Canadian Policy 
concerning Environmental Migration
The Canadian government’s responses to international 
events causing forced migration has often been applauded 
internationally. These responses, however, have not come as 
a result of a long history of advanced planning and antici-
patory policy, but almost always as temporary or “special 
measures.” Special measures remain an important piece of 
Canada’s overall migration policy. Special measures pro-
grams were implemented for refugee crises in Lebanon 
in 1979, Poland in 1980, El Salvador in 1981, Sri Lanka in 
1983, China in 1989, Kosovo in 2000, Haiti in 2010, and 
most recently as a response to the catastrophe that followed 
Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Just like these past 
events, a similar confluence of international and domestic 
influences continues to play an important role in deter-
mining which refugee crises receive formal policy atten-
tion. It is notable, then, that not every major incidence of 
forced migration elicits a Canadian response. The lack of 
a significant Canadian response to humanitarian crises in 
Afghanistan and parts of sub-Saharan Africa are notable 
examples.
Although civil war, ethnic conflict, and environmental 
disasters have ravaged Afghanistan and several countries 
in central Africa and the eastern horn of Africa, Canada 
has not put in place clear migration policies to aid in the 
repeated refugee crises affecting these countries or regions. 
The Canadian government has repeatedly maintained that 
the solution to Africa’s problems “can only be found in 
Africa, by Africans.”35 Perhaps political differences, for-
eign government influence, or some other form of bias may 
explain Canada’s unwillingness to accept significant num-
bers of refugees from Afghanistan and African countries. 
For example, in 2011, the worst drought in 60 years, wide-
spread famine, and persistent conflict displaced 200,000 
Somalis into Kenya.36 Unlike in the case of the earthquake 
in Haiti, however, the Canadian government did not create 
any temporary special measures to assist Somali refugees to 
receive expedited services or processing, despite being home 
to one of the highest concentrations of Somalis outside of 
Somalia in the world. Financial assistance was provided 
to help with food relief, but not to facilitate migration. No 
policies such as the Temporary Suspension of Removals that 
were used after the Haitian earthquake or special immigra-
tion measures were implemented as part of its humanitar-
ian response to the crisis. Canada’s policy regarding African 
refugees generally corresponds with the United Nations 
policy on refugee resettlement, which advocates for the use 
of third-country resettlement only as a last resort,37 prefer-
ring instead the durable solutions of repatriation and local 
integration when responding to humanitarian crises.
A number of factors internal and external to Canada 
explain its response to incidences of forced migration. 
Internally, ethnic or cultural communities and their influ-
ence or role in Canadian society; domestic political and 
social advocacy, national and provincial political ideology 
and affinity for the international incident, and the trac-
tion of an incident in the media all seem significant factors 
driving national response. But as we have noted in relation 
to more recent global events, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the weight that these internal factors have on the 
national response is not clear, but is certainly worthy of 
future investigation. For example, under what conditions 
is a national government susceptible to domestic pressure 
and advocacy? This question is also important when consid-
ering the external factors that drive the Canadian national 
response. Under what conditions, for example, will the 
Canadian government reach out to or engage in an organ-
ized international response to an incidence of environmental 
migration or widespread persecution? Is national pressure 
on Canada, vis-à-vis another nation-state, more powerful 
than pressure from the UNHCR? Again, future research 
that examines a number of cases may be able to unpack 
this question more fully. Ultimately, the factors that push, 
persuade, or provide incentives for the national govern-
ment to respond to environmental and non-environmental 
incidents are wide ranging. But what does remain consist-
ent in most cases is that responses to forced displacement 
in Canada are reactive. Returning to the primary focus of 
this paper, the question that remains to be answered is, what 
does the study of the Canadian response to international 
migration emergencies and displacements contribute to an 
understanding of the links between national immigration 
policy and environmental migration?
It is difficult to generalize; nonetheless, the preced-
ing discussion reveals useful insights relevant to issues of 
environmental migration. First, the history of migration 
policy (whether related to environmental events or not) 
provides important lessons about national humanitarian 
responses to environmental migration. The causes and 
consequences of displacement are complex, requiring input 
from a wide range of policy areas; nevertheless, it seems 
clear that Canada and a majority of other Western countries 
believe that immigration policy has a seat at the table in 
debates regarding the appropriate response to forced migra-
tion—environmentally caused or otherwise. Be it refugees 
fleeing the violent oppression of a dictatorial government or 
Haitians seeking to rebuild their lives after an earthquake, 
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facilitating the efforts of people trying to escape dangerous 
circumstances ought to be a key part of the policy discussion.
Second, immigration policy is not static and does not 
exist in a vacuum. Every government will have its own 
agenda and priorities regarding humanitarian responses; 
they are, nonetheless, subject to a complex interplay of 
interests, both domestic and international. For example, 
despite Canada’s significant level of involvement in the 
response to Haiti’s environmental migrants in 2010, the 
relief efforts required the contributions of various inter-
national organizations and foreign governments, each with 
its own particular set of objectives, in addition to the resolve 
of the Haitian people themselves. Environmental migra-
tion is characterized by its interrelations with other social, 
political, security, and economic issues. The complexity 
and scale of environmental migration events requires that 
an effective response have the widespread support of the 
international community. In Canada, allied foreign gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations (particu-
larly the UNHCR) have been influential in determining the 
direction of Canada’s migration policy. But their influence 
cannot be generalized, given the variation in Canadian 
response to various international events. The current level 
of support for environmental migrants is not dependent 
solely on the policy direction of any individual nation or 
external pressure. Major changes to current Canadian 
practices regarding environmental migration will likely 
occur only if a significant number of like-minded coun-
tries within the international community deem it neces-
sary. But as the example of Canada’s withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol reveals, national interests do not always fol-
low international norms. Each government is different and 
weighs the value of international engagement and cooper-
ation differently, and usually on a case-by-case basis. Hence, 
Canadian policy-makers and the Canadian government 
must consider whether they wish to lead or follow inter-
national action on the issue of environmental migration. 
In 2012, for example, Norway and Switzerland announced 
their intent to formally create a global office and initiative 
to respond to environmental refugees. Named after the first 
UN high commissioner of refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, the 
Nansen Initiative “aims to address the legal and protection 
gap for people displaced across borders owing to environ-
mental change and extreme weather events.”38
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Canadian immi-
gration policy offers interesting lessons regarding the future 
direction of environmental migration policy. In the short 
term, it is likely that governments will continue to respond 
to incidences of environmental migration using reactive, 
ad hoc, and temporary measures. The history of refugee 
policy in Canada demonstrates that special measures and 
ad hoc responses are the norm, while the formal protections 
offered to refugees as defined by the refugee convention are 
an exception to this standard practice. The international 
refugee regime was borne out of the particular circum-
stances of forced migration that arose during and after the 
Second World War. Environmental migration has yet to 
have an analogous impact on Western nations, and while 
there are promising signs that the international community 
is willing to talk more openly about the need to respond to 
the issue, without a comparable level of disruption, it seems 
unlikely that a response of a similar magnitude will occur in 
the near future. Given that global levels of forced migration 
due to environmental change and incidents are expected to 
continue and increase, and that Canada will be expected to 
be an international partner and willing migrant-receiving 
nation, it would seem pragmatic, if not ethical, to be part 
of the global solution to ensure that reliability, consistency, 
and predictability are strong principles underlying a global 
response to environmental migration events. Hence, for 
Canada, the question remains whether the country will take 
a lead role in the global debate about future responses to 
environmental migration or whether it will be satisfied rely-
ing on temporary measures.
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